THE year was 1983. Cold War sabre-rattling was at its peak. Now freshly declassified documents show how a war game in Europe brought us frighteningly close to nuclear armageddon.
Could it happen again?
The war of words leading up to the Cold War Western multinational military exercise is being echoed again, as Europe engages in a string of manoeuvres on a scale not seen for decades.
The biggest is even now wrapping up: Operation Trident Juncture involved 36,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 ships have just gone through the motions of war in Europe and the Mediterranean.
LEST WE FORGET?
The documents released last month by the US National Security Archive relate to a 1990 report titled: The “Soviet War Scareâ€. It took them seven years to realise just how deadly the November 1983 war game, named Able Archer, really was.
“In 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger,†the report states. “Soviet military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the U.S. would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real attack.â€
Here’s how.
Tensions were high: Just months earlier, Korean Air Lines Flight 007 had been shot down by a Soviet jet fighter — with the loss of 269 lives.
It was a large scale military exercise.
It was being conducted in Eastern Europe.
The Soviets were convinced it was preparations for a real US nuclear first strike.
Its response?
To mobilise its own forces to a maximum height of readiness. This included arming intercontinental nuclear missiles — and putting fingers on the triggers. Nuclear response times were cut from hours to just 20 minutes.
All it would take to pull the trigger would be one last tell-tale act by the US...
FIRST STRIKE
Back then, the bluster and bravado associated with war games had been repeated so often, nobody paid any attention to it anymore.
But this time the Russians were seriously scared.
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United States intelligence services didn’t know this. ‘Wolf’ had been cried too many times before — by both sides.
Western analysts also could not bring themselves to believe that Russia seriously feared the US would launch a first strike. So they ignored any indication that this may be so.
But the 1990 report — with the benefit of hindsight — recognised the early 1980s conditions were ripe to be interpreted in just that way.
The US had just embarked upon an immensely expensive program to upgrade its nuclear weapon arsenal. But Moscow’s struggling economy was not in a position to do the same. They knew their military was becoming relatively weaker.
WINNABLE WAR
In 1983, the tenuous balance of ‘mutually assured destruction’ appeared about to tip in the favour of the US.
A ‘winnable’ first strike nuclear war suddenly seemed plausible: At least for the Americans.
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This generated a deep-set sense of fear in the Russian government and military. They became paranoid.
“KGB officers agreed that the United States might initiate a nuclear strike if it achieved a level of overall strength markedly greater than that of the Soviet Union. And many agreed that events were leading in that direction,†the report states.
Moscow knew their only chance of ‘winning’ a nuclear war depended upon them getting in first.
So all they needed now was definitive proof that the US was preparing to attack.
Consequently, the KGB issued orders to its operatives to “discover the adversaries’ concrete plans and measures linked with his preparation for a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR and other Soviet countries.â€
Typically, if you look for something — you’re bound to find it.
MOUNTING EVIDENCE
The steady flow of information about US military advances and activities was being interpreted in the context of a looming surprise attack.
“Soviet analysts calculated that the US intended (new missiles) as a means for developing a first strike force,†the report reads.
And then came Able Archer.
It was to simulate a co-ordinated nuclear war. Heads of government were included in the games. It was conducted under extensive radio silence, or new unbroken codes.
To the Russians, this was indistinguishable from the real thing.
Tens of thousands of US troops were being rushed by air to Europe.
But there was more. And the Russians noticed it.
“We are told that some US aircraft practised their nuclear warhead handling procedures, including taxiing out of hangars carrying realistic-looking dummy warheads,†the report reads.
To the Soviets, ‘this was it’.
They pulled their own live nuclear warheads out of storage — rushing them to front line units via helicopter. Bombers and submarines were hurriedly being prepared for active deployment.
Western intelligence missed it all.
Until 1990.
‘Some Soviet forces were preparing to pre-empt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Able Archer,’ the 1990 report belated recognises.
STARING INTO THE ABYSS
How was war averted?
The report suggests this was only because of a “fortuitous, if ill-informed†mistake.
The West did not raise its ‘real’ alert status in response to Russia’s heightened state of readiness - because it didn’t notice.
Doing so would have acted as confirmation for the Soviet’s paranoia — and possibly tipped Moscow over the edge.
But the US never changed its ‘DEFCON’ status. So Russia continued to hesitate.
This time, the incompetence of the West’s intelligence services may have actually saved civilisation as we know it.